Products and Coproducts
Let’s consider the Cartesian product of two sets
and
. Classically we think of this as the set of all pairs
with
and
. But we can also characterize it just in terms of functions.
Specifically, comes with two projection functions
and
, defined by
and
. If we take any other set
with functions
and
we can define the function
by
. Then we see that
and
. Further, this function from
to
is the only such function.
Now let’s do away with those nasty elements altogether and draw this diagram:

What does this mean? Well, it’s like the diagram I drew for products of groups. The product of and
is a set
with functions
and
so that for any other set
with functions to
and
there exists a unique arrow to
making the diagram commute. Since we’ve written this definition without ever really referring to elements we can just pick it up and drop it into any other category. Many descriptions of categorical products stop here, but let’s push a bit further.
Let’s consider a category containing (among others) objects
and
. From this we’re going to build a new category. An object of our category will be a diagram that looks like
in
. A morphism from
to
will be a morphism
in
so that
and
.
Now what’s a product in ? It’s a terminal object of this category we’ve constructed! That is, it’s one of these diagrams so that every other diagram has a unique morphism (as defined above) to it. This definition makes sense in any category
, though the category we build from a given pair of objects may not have a terminal object, so a given pair of objects of
may not have a product in
. If every pair of objects of
has a product in
, we say that
“has products”.
So, the existence of Cartesian products of sets shows that has products. Similarly,
has products, as do
,
(groupoids),
(small categories), and pretty much all our familiar categories from algebra.
What about something like a preordered set , considered as a category? What would “product” mean, when written in this language? Well, given elements
and
the product
will have arrows to
and
, so
and
. Also, for any other element
with
and
we have
—
has an arrow to both
and
, so it has an arrow to
. That is,
is a greatest lower bound of
and
, and the category has products if and only if every pair of elements has such a greatest lower bound.
And it gets better. If we consider a category that has products, the product defines a functor
! If we have arrows
and
then I say we’ll have an arrow
. Indeed, if we consider
and
then we’ll get an arrow from
to
. And this construction preserves compositions and identities. For compositions, start with this diagram:

and draw in the induced arrows ,
, and
. Then use the uniqueness part of the universal property to show that the composite of the first two must be the same as the third. Do a similar thing to verify that identities are also preserved.
Finally, we can flip all the arrows in what we’ve said to get the dual notion: coproducts. Use this diagram:

and define the coproduct to be an initial object in a certain category of diagrams. Check that in this property is satisfied by disjoint unions. In
coproducts are free products. In a preorder, coproducts are least upper bounds. And, of course, the coproduct defines a functor from
to
.
There’s a fair bit to digest here, but it’s worth it. The next few ideas are really very similar. Alternatively, you could take this to mean that if you don’t completely get it now there are a few more examples in the pipe that may help.
Why I think undergraduates will need category theory
In the comments to my first category theory post, Peter had something interesting to say. So interesting, in fact, that I decided to promote my response to an actual post.
I said “algebra” rather than “mathematics” in that post for two reasons.
First of all, yes it is a form of algebra, and the theory of small categories is every bit as useful as the theory of groups and rings and such. Categories are “like monoids but more so”, and linear categories are “like rings but more so”. Small categories are great algebraic structures in their own right, but more on that later. As for the metamathematical side, just because other forms of mathematics find such a beautiful expression in an algebraic language doesn’t make the language any less algebra.
Secondly, algebra is already seen in some circles as being further removed from reality than, say, analysis. There does exist the view that analysis is real mathematics, algebra a convenient abstraction for generalizing and streamlining analytic theories, and category theory just abstract nonsense.
As for your comparisons.. what’s so surprising about Brauer groups or Ricci flow (I must confess I’m not familiar with the Kakeya problem)? Bruce Kleiner explained Ricci flow to me in no more than five minutes, and other than all that analytic messiness Perelman worked out it seems perfectly natural that it should work. Brauer groups are even simpler, at least from the categorical viewpoint, although I’m still mystified why people want to work with the decategorification rather than the real thing.
My example of the natural transformation from the identity functor to the double-dual was just that — an example. And I brought it out because that was what gripped me when I first saw it. It’s fascinating (to me) that there’s a language and a definition of what we rhetorically call “natural”.
And why is there this undercurrent (not just in your comment) that mathematics has to be so hard to be interesting? The verification of many fine theorems is perfectly simple once you’ve set them up correctly. Grothendieck himself said he’d rather let a nut open on its own under the influence of the sun and the rain than to go at it with hammer and chisel.
What makes Yoneda’s Lemma so fascinating is not that it’s amazingly difficult, but that it’s both simple and transcendent. It’s what makes Cayley’s theorem go. It’s what makes quite a lot of modern algebraic geometry go. It’s even what makes tensor products go, which I haven’t seen written down, but I’m certain someone else had it figured out long before I stumbled upon it a couple years ago.
Now eventually I’ll be able to get right down and talk more directly about my own work, and that may satisfy you. In fact, it goes back to my first response: tangles form a category, and this allows a directly algebraic attack on knot theory, which I think will eventually become the new foundation of the subject. In fact, knot theory only becomes more and more complex the harder you fight against looking at the category of tangles. When you lay back and enjoy it, the proofs become almost effortless and the meaning becomes clear.
Now, maybe that sort of thing doesn’t appeal to you. Maybe you explicitly (not just implicitly) think that mathematics is supposed to be difficult. But there we would have to disagree. Mathematics is getting too complicated for even people who use it (like physicists) to get in all they need to know without some form of analogizing, and analogies in mathematics are called “functors”. Thinking categorically lays bare the inherent structure of an argument.
I’m not saying that every student will need to use categories in the future. I’m saying that undergraduates being conversant with basic categorical language will become pedagogically necessary in order to get through all the other mathematics they should be learning.
About this weblog
This is mainly an expository blath, with occasional high-level excursions, humorous observations, rants, and musings. The main-line exposition should be accessible to the “Generally Interested Lay Audience”, as long as you trace the links back towards the basics. Check the sidebar for specific topics (under “Categories”).
I’m in the process of tweaking some aspects of the site to make it easier to refer back to older topics, so try to make the best of it for now.